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“It is not a case of choosing those [faces] which, to the best of one’s judgment, are really the prettiest, nor
even those which average opinion genuinely thinks the prettiest.  We have reached the third degree where
we devote our intelligences to anticipating what average opinion expects the average opinion to be.  And
there are some, I believe, who practise the fourth, fifth and higher degrees.”
11    E N G I N E E R I N G  &  S C I E N C E  N O .  1
Taxi  Drivers and Beauty Contests
by Col in F. Camerer
to have been familiar with it as well, as the open-
ing couplet of his ballad “Taxi” bears witness: “It
was raining hard on a Saturday / I needed one
more fare to make my night.”)  Many of the driv-
ers we talked to said they decided how long to
work by setting themselves an income target every
day—for example, they might want to earn $150
in cash in order to clear $75 beyond the rental
fee—and when they reach that target, they quit.
Target setting can be very motivating in unpleas-
ant or tedious activities, like exercise.  There’s also
substantial psychological evidence that people dis-
like losing a lot more than they like corresponding
amounts of winning.  This implies that drivers
hate to quit before they reach the target, but once
they reach it, they aren’t very enthusiastic about
trying to go beyond.  So income targeting per-
versely predicts that cabbies are going to quit
earlier on good days.  If you want to make $150
and you’re earning $25 an hour (which would be
a pretty good day for these guys), you can go home
after six hours.  But on a bad day, when you’re
earning $15 an hour, you’ve got to drive ten hours.
The labor-supply curve will be a hyperbola, which
is also shown on the following page.
These two theories thus give very different
predictions, which we tested in our study.  We
analyzed 3,000 observations of cabdrivers’ behav-
ior from the years 1988, 1990, and 1994.  The
data came from the New York City Taxi and
Limousine Commission, ironically known as the
TLC, which had collected it for other studies.
These data were in the form of taximeter readings,
and the TLC was kind enough to give them to us
(for free!) on floppy disks—bureaucracy has its
moments.  When you get into a cab, the driver
punches a button and a meter automatically
records the number of miles driven and the
amount of time spent sitting in traffic.  From the
meter records we could compute a driver’s earn-
ings, except for tips.  Tips aren’t recorded any-
where, so we left them out of our analysis, but
The trading floor of the
New York Stock Exchange.
The British economist John
Maynard Keynes likened
playing the market to
voting for the prettiest
face in a beauty contest;
hence the second part of
this article’s title.
I spent a year in New York City not long ago,
and I took a lot of cabs.  Most cabdrivers in New
York are independent contractors.  They rent the
cab from a taxi company for $76—paid in
advance—for 12 hours.  They keep all the fares
they collect, and they can call it quits and return
the cab at any time before the 12 hours are up.
Because Manhattan is so crowded, drivers usually
just cruise the streets waiting for someone to hail
them.  Some days are especially good—when it
rains or snows, during the holidays, or when a
convention is in town, for example.  Other days
are bad—weekends, when fewer businesspeople
are around; and the summer is slow because people
leave Manhattan to escape the heat, humidity, and
gunfire.  So Linda Babcock (whose father, Charles
Babcock [MS ’58, PhD ’62], was a professor of
aeronautics and applied mechanics at Caltech until
his untimely death in 1987) and George Loewen-
stein of Carnegie Mellon University, Richard
Thaler of the University of Chicago, and I became
curious about a simple question—how does the
amount of hours a cabbie works vary with that
day’s average hourly earnings?  There are two basic
theories that might apply.  One is called the law
of supply.  The other, which we crafted from bits
and pieces of psychology, we call “daily income
targeting.”
The law of supply is the twin sister of the law
of demand—people should want to sell more of
something when the price is high than when the
price is low, assuming everything else is constant.
So you’ll sell more of your labor hours when wages
are high, and the so-called labor-supply curve
slopes upward, as shown on the page after this
one.  The law of supply says that you should work
a lot when it pays to do so, and when it doesn’t
pay, go home!  Take time off.
The other theory, daily income targeting, was
taught to us by the cabdrivers, many of whom
are amateur philosophers, political scientists, and
labor economists.  (The late Harry Chapin appears
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on average they’re probably 10–15 percent of the
driver’s income and do not vary much from day to
day.  The meter data should represent the bulk of
the driver’s income accurately.
A scatter plot of some of our data is shown at
the top of the opposite page.  I should warn the
faint of heart that it looks very messy, but as eco-
nomic data go—particularly in areas like labor
economics, where there are lots of external factors
that influence the data—this is actually a pretty
strong correlation.  I hope you can see that the line
of best fit through this cloud of data slopes down-
ward.  In fact, the slope is significantly negative
to a confidence level of more than 99.9 percent.
So the data clearly support the targeting theory
rather than the law of supply.
There’s an objection that can be raised here—
in order to follow the law of supply, you’ve got
to have a certain level of economic security.  These
guys may have to keep driving until they make
$150 because they need the cash—they don’t have
enough savings to buy groceries and pay the rent
if they quit early on slow days.  The reason we
don’t think this explains our findings is because
some drivers in our samples own their own cabs.
In order to legally operate a cab in New York City,
you have to own a taxi medallion—an ugly,
plastic-metal thing that’s pasted on the hood of
the cab.  These medallions are restricted in supply
(there are only 11,387 of them, and that number
has been fixed for 60 years), so they’re quite
valuable.  They’re worth about $150,000, yet
10 percent of the drivers in our samples own one
personally.  If we assume that the drivers who can
afford to own a medallion have some cash in the
bank, we might predict that they would behave
differently than the renters.  But both groups
seem to behave about the same way.
Another important consideration is that cab-
drivers vary in experience.  Happily for us, New
York City cabdriving licenses are numbered chro-
nologically by date of first issue, so the person
Above: The labor-supply
curve.  Wages are plotted
on the vertical axis; hours
worked on the horizontal
one.  The law of supply
says that when the hourly
wage goes up, people will
work longer hours (left).
The income-targeting
theory predicts the
opposite: people will work
less as their hourly wage
rises (right).  If hours and
wages were plotted on
logarithmic scales instead
of linear ones, this
hyperbola would plot as a
downward-sloping line.
Above: Some of the meter
data were verified by
examining “trip sheets”
such as this one, in which
drivers log (from left)
pickup point, pickup time,
destination, dropoff time,
number of passengers,
and fare.
13    E N G I N E E R I N G  &  S C I E N C E  N O .  1
with license number 14,682 got it just after the
person with number 14,681.  Therefore, we can
sort drivers into high- and low-experience groups
by their license numbers.  Look at the difference
in their labor-supply curves, as shown at left.
Again, the data are noisy, but the low-experience
drivers on the left have a slope very close to −1,
which is what the income-targeting theory pre-
dicts.  (A slope of −1 means that if your wage goes
up by 10 percent, you cut your hours back by 10
percent to keep your income constant.)  The high-
experience drivers on the right still don’t look
much like they’re obeying the law of supply, but
it does appear as if experience is teaching them
to make hay while the sun shines—to drive longer
hours on good days.
This distinction between new and old drivers
is important because about half of the cabbies in
New York have been driving cabs for less than a
year.  In 1991, over 40 percent of all New York
cabdrivers were born on the Indian subcontinent,
11 percent were from Africa, and another seven
percent each were from the Caribbean, the Middle
East, and the former Soviet Union.  Only about 10
percent were born in the United States.  The point
is that driving a cab is an entry-level job for many
immigrants, so there’s a constant inflow and out-
flow of new drivers.  These inexperienced drivers
may be using the income-targeting rule because
they haven’t yet figured out that they can do better
by obeying the law of supply.
We learned two basic lessons from this study.
The first is that cabbies would get an automatic
raise of 8 percent if they drove the same number
of hours every day, rather than knocking off early
on the good days and working late on the bad
days.  If they obeyed the law of supply, they could
earn 15 percent more income.  The median annual
wage of these drivers in 1995 was about $22,000 a
year, so they could have made about $2,000 more
per year by simply changing their driving habits.
The second, more important lesson is that
Top: If you look at a log-
arithmic plot of the labor-
supply curve for a sample
of taxi drivers, you can see
that the line of best fit
slopes downward, contrary
to the law of supply.
Bottom: But if you analyze
the sample’s inexperienced
(upper) and experienced
(lower) drivers separately,
you will find that the
experienced drivers’ curve
is more nearly horizontal.
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the tax rates on cabdrivers to give them a higher
after-tax wage, it looks as if they would drive fewer
hours, not more.
Let me move on to beauty contests.  Here
I don’t mean the Miss America pageant or the
tryouts for Rose Parade queen, but you’ll see in a
moment where the term comes from.  Imagine the
following game:  Everybody picks a number from
0 to 100.  I compute the average of all your picks,
and whoever’s number is closest to two-thirds of
that average wins.  (We actually do this in experi-
ments on students.  The winner gets $20, so they
think carefully before they choose.)  Everyone
wants to be at two-thirds of the average, but
everyone else does, too, so the real goal of the
contest is to guess what everyone else will guess.
This is like playing the stock market.  The
economist John Maynard Keynes remarked in
the 1930s that the stock market is like a beauty
contest.  He had in mind contests that were popu-
lar in England at the time, where a newspaper
would print 100 photographs, and people would
write in and say which six faces they liked most.
Everyone who picked the most popular face was
automatically entered in a raffle, where they could
win a prize.  Keynes wrote, “It is not a case of
choosing those [faces] which, to the best of one’s
judgment, are really the prettiest, nor even those
which average opinion genuinely thinks the pret-
tiest.  We have reached the third degree where
we devote our intelligences to anticipating what
average opinion expects the average opinion to be.
And there are some, I believe, who practise the
fourth, fifth and higher degrees.”
If you played this game repeatedly, your
thoughts might run as follows.  You’d assume
that the starting average would probably be 50,
so you’d guess 33.  But then you’d say, hmmmm,
if other people are as clever as I am, they will all
pick 33, so I should pick 22.  But if everyone else
does that, too, I should pick two-thirds of 22.
And if you carry this through infinitely many
Photo courtesy of the John W. Hartman Center for Sales, Advertising and Marketing History, Duke University
The “Miss Rheingold”
campaign, run by the J.
Walter Thompson Co. for
Liebmann Breweries, Inc.
for over 25 years, is the
best-known American
example of a Keynesian
beauty contest.  At the
height of its popularity,
between 15 and 20 million
votes were cast per year—
a turnout second only to
the Presidential elections.
perhaps we should be skeptical about simple
economic principles like the law of supply.  Most
previous studies were inconclusive about whether
the supply curve even went up or down, because
most people’s salaries change relatively rarely—
once a year, perhaps.  But cabdrivers earn a differ-
ent hourly wage every day, and they can adjust the
numbers of hours they drive, so there’s enough
variation in the data to see trends.  That’s why our
study shows more clearly than ever before that for
taxi drivers, the labor-supply curve slopes down,
not up.  During the Reagan years, supply-side
economists argued that if income taxes were cut,
the after-tax wage would rise.  That’s just simple
arithmetic.  And then, the argument went, people
could earn more spending money by working an
extra hour, so people would work extra hours, and
everyone would be better off.  Very logical.  Our
results suggest the opposite—if you were to lower
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levels of reasoning to the logical end, you’ll wind
up picking zero.  If I were speaking to a game-
theory audience, people would nod profoundly,
because zero is what game theory predicts for this
situation.  Game theory is the branch of social
science that analyzes strategic interactions in
mathematical terms.  It was founded quite a long
time ago, but it’s had a slow fuse—only in the last
10 or 15 years has it come to the fore in reasoning
about economics and political science.  (In fact,
people here at Caltech helped establish the use
of game theory in political science, and still do
quite a lot of it.)
So how do people actually behave?  Do they
pick zero?  The data at left are from experiments
on undergrads from Singapore, Germany, the
Wharton School of Business at the University
of Pennsylvania, and Caltech.  The German data
were collected by Rosemarie Nagel of the Univer-
sity of Pompeu Fabra.  The Singaporean data were
collected by Teck-Hua Ho and Keith Weigelt;
they also collaborated with me on the Wharton
data.  (Ho and Weigelt, who are now on the facul-
ty at Wharton, were both students of mine when
I was there.)  The average pick across all these
experiments was around 40, so if you guessed
about two-thirds of 40, or 27, you’d probably win.
Notice that 40 is somewhat less than 50, so if we
use these data to gauge how many steps of reason-
ing people are doing about other people’s reason-
ing, some number from one to three seems reason-
able.  It’s clearly not the game-theory prediction
of infinity, but it also clearly demonstrates the
performance of at least one step of reasoning.
We’re now trying to refine this estimate of how
many steps of reasoning seem natural, and how it
varies with education and other factors.  For exam-
ple, no Caltech student chose above 40.  Most
Techers picked numbers between 30 and 40.
Several picked in the neighborhood of 10 or 20,
and 10 percent of them did, in fact, actually pick
zero.  The Caltech students and the German stu-
How real people behave in
a one-round beauty
contest.  The two graphs
show the same four sets of
data, but in two different
front-to-back orderings to
minimize the number of
short bars that are
obscured by taller bars in
front.  (The colors,
however, don’t travel with
the bars.)
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dents appear to have been reasoning one or two
steps more deeply than the Wharton students
and the students in Singapore.
We’ve also conducted this experiment, more
informally, with other groups of subjects.  (Repli-
cation with different groups of people is, of course,
essential if we want to generalize our findings to
all human beings.)  The plot at left shows four
more groups.  The front two groups in the top
figure are PhD students in economics (none from
Caltech), who may have had some exposure to
game theory.  And, in fact, compared to the under-
grads in the previous plot (except for the Techers),
these PhD students do choose lower numbers.
The average pick here is around 25—one step
beyond the undergrads.  The additional education
is doing something.  The group labeled “Caltech
Board” is from an experiment I conducted when
I gave a talk at a meeting of Caltech’s Board of
Trustees in the fall of 1995.  There were about
80 or 90 people there, including spouses and some
people from the faculty and administration, and I
just couldn’t resist the opportunity to see how
they would behave.  The Caltech Board is a truly
amazing group that includes many extremely
successful businessmen, some billionaires, several
brilliant scientists, and two former judges.  Notice
that they act pretty much like the college stu-
dents—the average pick is about 40.  But a few
people do choose very low numbers, like zero.
And several people, who may have been confused
because I didn’t explain the procedure as carefully
and thoroughly as I would have in a real experi-
ment, picked very high numbers.  This was not
a well-run experiment, but the subject pool is
so unusual that I’ll show it nonetheless.
The sample labeled “CEOs” is really remarkable.
We’ve seen that college students do not obey game
theory, which assumes that people are perfectly
rational.  (This is hardly surprising to anybody
with teenagers in college.)  So it’s easy to criticize
our experiments by saying that what really matters
Four more sets of data,
again presented in two
different orders from front
to back.  The University of
Chicago PhD data is cour-
tesy of Richard Thaler.
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is not what a bunch of college kids do, but wheth-
er the people who run large businesses behave
according to economic theory.  Well, the Caltech
Board includes 20 chief executive officers, presi-
dents, and corporate-board chairmen.  These titans
of industry are the “CEOs” sample.  As you can
see, none of them picked zero; and if any one of
them had, that person would have lost.  So they
obviously knew who they were playing with.  A
few of them picked surprisingly high numbers,
but the tallest spike is between 30 and 39, and
there’s another tall spike between 20 and 29.
If you do the math, it turns out that they were
reasoning about one step further than the other
people at the meeting.  The numbers they chose
are statistically indistinguishable from the num-
bers the Caltech undergraduates and the econ PhD
students chose.
The game-theory prediction was flat-out wrong.
The same pattern emerged across three continents,
both genders, and a tremendous variation in age,
wealth, and educational background.
But what happens if we allow people to learn
by announcing the winning number and repeating
the game?  Then we see a steady, slow convergence
toward the game-theory prediction.  The graph
above shows what happened when the Singaporean
students played a multi-round version of the
game.  After 10 rounds, about 50 or 60 percent of
the students were choosing numbers between zero
and 10.  So game theory, which seemed so laugh-
able at first, does predict what people will do with
repetition.  Again, psychology helps us understand
what happens at first, and game theory tells us
what will happen eventually as people learn.
We need both to understand the entire picture.
This brings me to the stock market.  That
passage from Keynes describes a market in which
investors care about what other investors will buy
in the future.  Here, you often pay more than a
firm is worth, because you think that somebody
else will pay even more later on.  This strategy is
sometimes called the “greater-fool theory,” because
even though you’re a fool to pay as much as you
did, you’re betting that there’s a greater fool just
down the road.  And if you’re right, then of course
you aren’t being foolish.
Economists call this a bubble.  Prices rise
simply because people expect them to rise, and it’s
a self-fulfilling prophecy right up to the moment
when the bubble bursts.  One famous example is
that of tulip bulbs in Holland during the 1600s.
People were paying several months’ income for
rare tulip bulbs.  Thoroughbred horses in the
1970s, and L.A. real estate in the 1980s are other
examples, as are booms in works by dead artists
(who can’t produce any more supply).  The Japan-
ese economy in the 1980s might be the most
spectacular example in world history.  However,
a business-school professor who teaches about the
stock market would probably be reluctant to
admit that these episodes are bubbles, in the
sense that I’ve defined the term.  I’m asserting
that people are consciously paying more than
the intrinsic value of the asset, but the professor
would probably say that we don’t know its intrin-
sic value.  How do you measure the intrinsic value
of, say, Van Gogh’s Sunflowers?  Maybe it was a
bargain at $50 million.  Instead, most of the
experts believe in the so-called efficient-market
theory, which says that information about a stock’s
worth will quickly be reflected in its price.
It would be nice if we had an example to con-
vince the experts who believe that markets are
efficient.  Until a couple of decades ago, people
thought that economics, like astronomy, was not
an experimental science—all you could do was
study the data that the market provided.  But in
fact, many of the most interesting propositions
in economics can be tested experimentally.  About
10 years ago, Charles Plott, the Harkness Profes-
sor of Economics and Political Science, founded
the Experimental Economics and Political Science
Laboratory at Caltech.  The whole thing is run
When people play the
beauty-contest game for
several rounds against the
same group of opponents,
the behavior quickly
converges to what game
theory predicts will
happen.
This strategy is sometimes called the “greater-fool theory,” because even
though you’re a fool to pay as much as you did, you’re betting that there’s a
greater fool just down the road.  And if you’re right, then of course you aren’t
being foolish.
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by computer and functions very much like a real
market.   (You can also study elections and other
processes in it.)  Each participant is isolated in a
booth, and cannot communicate with other par-
ticipants in any way except through the computer.
People type in offers to sell x number of shares at
such-and-such a price, or bids to buy, and all the
offers and bids are displayed on everyone’s com-
puter screens.  Players consummate trades with
the push of a button.  The computer records all
offers, bids, and transactions sequentially; keeps
track of who owns what; and calculates everyone’s
earnings.  (Again, the students get paid real mon-
ey, so we can be sure that they’re taking this seri-
ously and are giving it their best effort.)  Every-
thing is recorded as it happens, and software de-
veloped by Plott enables us to make a “movie” of
how the market behaves, and analyze it in detail.
In these experiments, we created a market for
an asset we invented whose value we chose.  The
students traded a share—a bond, if you will—for
15 five-minute periods.  Each share paid a divi-
dend of 24 cents at the end of each period, so if
you held on to a share for all 15 periods, you’d
earn $3.60.  Everyone had a couple of shares to
start with, and some money to buy more shares
if they wanted to.  The question we wanted to
answer was, what would the price of the shares
be?  The efficient-market theory is very clear on
this.  It says that since everyone knew the share
paid a total of $3.60 in dividends (we told them
that, by the way—we gave them a table of divi-
dends versus periods remaining), then the price
of the share should be $3.60 in the first period.
In the second period, the price should drop by
24 cents to $3.36, and so on.
Shown above is what real traders did in a typical
experiment.  The slanting purple line shows the
shares’ declining dividend value.  Each dot is an
attempt to sell or buy; all the completed transac-
tions are connected by the red line.  Dots above
the red line are sellers asking too much, and dots
below the line are buyers offering too little.
Notice that the price remains flat at around
$3.50—even close to the end, where the efficient-
market theory says the shares are worth less than
a buck.  (This is like those of you who bought a
house in L.A. a few years ago, and refused to sell
as the market collapsed.)  The traders are trying to
forecast whether the market will crash, or whether
some nut will buy shares that are about to expire.
And finally, of course, the market collapses.
We know that everyone knew a share’s intrinsic
value because we gave them a quiz before the first
trading period began, so this is the clearest exam-
ple of a bubble that you could possibly have.
When we asked the subjects how it came about,
they’d tell us a story that sounded very much like
the greater-fool theory.  They’d say, sure I knew
the prices were way too high, but I saw other
people buying and selling at high prices.  I figured
I could buy, collect a dividend or two, and then
sell at the same price to some other idiot.  And,
of course, some of them were right.  As long as
they got out before the crash, they earned a lot of
money at the expense of the poor folks who were
left holding the bag.
We can see harbingers of the crash in what we’ve
come to call nervousness in the market.  Near the
end, some people who think that the market has
lost its mind will make extremely low bids.  These
people probably know that a lowball bid of a
dollar won’t be accepted when the going rate is
three times that, so we think this is their way of
expressing their surprise and warning everybody.
It’s the same as when somebody offers you
$350,000 for the house you’re desperately trying
to sell for the half million you paid for it a few
years ago.  This is their way of politely saying
you’re nuts—your house isn’t worth half a million.
After doing a number of such experiments,
we’ve learned how to turn these bubbles on and
off.  To turn the bubble off, we bring the same
group of subjects back and run the entire 15-
In this plot of an
experimental market, the
horizontal axis is time and
the vertical axis is the
price per share.  Every dot
is a proffered transaction;
the actual transactions are
connected by the red line.
The vertical green lines
denote the end of each
five-minute period, at
which point dividends
are paid.
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period market again.  We usually see a smaller
rise that crashes much earlier.  And if we bring
that same group back a third time, we hardly
get any bubble at all.  The market-price line
now follows the intrinsic-value line very closely,
so experienced traders do obey the efficient-
markets theory.  We can turn a bubble on by
having had our subjects participate in a previous
experiment in which we created inflation by
adding money to the economy, just the way
the government does.  If prices rose in that earlier
market—if they’ve lived through an inflationary
experience—then we’ve planted a belief in their
minds that prices will rise, like seeding clouds
to make rain.  Then, when we put them in the
bubble experiment, prices do rise, because of this
self-fulfilling prophecy based on their common
experience.  We don’t always see bubbles—
sometimes we see just what the efficient-market
theory predicts, with prices sliding down along
the intrinsic-value line.  But bubbles are very
common—the several of us doing this kind of
research have observed about a hundred of them.
This research is very new, and there are many
things we have yet to learn.  We need help from
cognitive psychology to understand what the
people in our experiments are thinking.  We need
better pattern-recognition and data-analysis tools
to help us look at the data and forecast when
bubbles will start and crashes occur.  Compared to
other experimental sciences like physics, chemis-
try, and biology, the amount of work that’s been
done in experimental economics is relatively
modest.
What does all this mean in the real world?
Perhaps one-third of the market’s trading volume
is due to a handful of mutual funds and other large
institutions.  These portfolio managers may not
behave rationally, either, although for other
reasons.  For example, they operate in a world
where if they have one bad quarter—worse than
everyone else—they may get fired.  So they ask
their colleagues, what are you guys buying?  They
want to buy what the other guys buy, so they don’t
finish last.  That, again, is very much like a
Keynesian beauty contest, and I think the prevail-
ing theories need to address it.  Peter Bossaerts,
an associate professor of finance here at Caltech, is
actually working on this now.  I should also point
out that nothing I’ve said addresses the issue of
stocks that haven’t paid dividends yet, but may
at some time in the future.  This is a very common
situation with growth stocks, such as those of
startup companies in biotechnology, software, and
other high-tech fields.  The closest we’ve come to
studying those was a couple of experiments where
the dividend wasn’t guaranteed—there was a large
chance you’d get nothing, and a small chance
you’d win big.  We did see some things that
looked like bubbles, but we haven’t done much
work in that area yet.
In conclusion, cabdrivers, beauty-contest games,
and stock-market experiments have a common
theme.  Inexperienced cabdrivers, novice beauty-
contest players, and traders participating in an
experimental stock market for the first time don’t
seem to conform to standard economic theory,
which assumes complete rationality by all partici-
pants.  However, their actions are reasonably well
explained by psychological theories that allow
people to have normal, limited reasoning ability,
and limited faith in others.  The subjects of these
experiments aren’t dumb, but they’re not perfectly
brilliant, either, and they’re not willing to bet a
lot of money that other people are.  But the
behavior of experienced drivers, players who play
the beauty contest over and over again, and traders
who return to the stock market is often explained
quite well by economic theories.  Experimental
observations help us figure out which theories are
true, and which are false, and under what condi-
tions.  So we think that combining the best ideas
in psychology and economics will make for the
best social science of all. 
The traders are trying to forecast whether the market will crash, or whether
some nut will buy shares that are about to expire.
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